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Abstract  
The present study considered the impact of gender essentialism on sex differences in 
subject choice. Secondary school children, aged 11-12 years (N = 30) and 15-16 years (N 
= 26), were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions, and completed 
a thought experiment requiring them to make inferences about two gendered 
attributes; academic subject ability and gender-stereotyped properties, of a 
hypothetical male and female; (a) raised in an opposite sex environment; (b) following a 
brain transplant from a member of the opposite sex and (c) a ‗normal‘ male or female, 
acting as a baseline response. Results from the experiment indicated that children do 
hold essentialist beliefs about gender. However, such beliefs vary as a function of both 
the age of participants, and the gendered attribute considered. We conclude that 
gender essentialism may account for the persistence of sex differences in subject 
choice.   
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Introduction  
 
In Britain, up to and including much of the twentieth century, differentiation by sex 
was used both formally and informally in schools for curricular and disciplinary 
purposes (Radford, 1996). Significant inroads were made following feminist 
interventions including, the passing of the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975, and the 
introduction of a National Curriculum in 1988, making it obligatory for all students to 
study science, mathematics and English up to the age of 16. However, despite such 
changes there remain significant sex differences in educational subject choice.  
While the examination entries of boys and girls are broadly even in compulsory 
subjects at GCSE level, there are significant sex differences in the take-up of optional 
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subjects such as I.T and social studies. There are also significant sex differences in 
subject choice at A level; girls are more likely to study art & design, English, textiles 
and social studies, whereas boys are more likely to study design and technology, 
mathematics, I.T and physics (DFES, 2007).  
 
The fact that boys and girls tend to choose different pathways through the 
education system may not be considered problematic given that they have access 
to all subjects. However, this is an important area of study as it has been found that 
the gender stereotyping of subjects is one of the major factors guiding subject 
choice. This, I will come to argue, renders the notion of ‗free choice‘ largely 
redundant (Kelly, 1981). Furthermore, the fact that boys and girls continue to make 
different subject choices has direct consequences for higher education and 
occupational opportunities (EOC, 2005), for example, entering stereotypically 
masculine or feminine occupations. The present study considers whether 
psychological essentialism, a theory of category representation, can offer an insight 
into the persistence of sex segregation in subject choices.   
 
Sex differences in subject choice  
 
The issue of sex differences in subject choice was placed on the research agenda 
by feminists in the 1970s. Research on gender and education highlighted a number 
of factors as influencing subject choice, including family background, school 
environment and inherent sex differences in cognitive abilities (Radford, 1996). 
Foremost among these was the gender stereotyping of subjects amongst students 
(Stanworth, 1981). Numerous studies have documented how school children 
distinguish between ‗masculine‘ subjects such as physics, I.T and mathematics, 
known collectively as the ‗sciences‘, and ‗feminine‘ subjects such as art, languages, 
and textiles, known as the ‗arts‘ (Archer & Macrae, 1991). There is evidence that 
boys show more of a bias in their subject choices than girls (Whitehead, 1996). It has 
also been found that the beliefs and behaviour of teachers in relation to gender can 
moderate gender stereotyping among children (Colley, 1998).  
 
In a more recent study Francis (2000) has suggested that there has been a decline in 
the gender-stereotyping of subjects such as mathematics and English. However, in 
this study children were asked to rate their favourite subjects which may not 
correlate with their actual subject choices.  Furthermore statistics for examination 
entries, discussed above, show no evidence of a decline in sex segregation in 
subject choice. Accordingly, Colley (1998) has argued that the gender stereotyping 
of academic subjects remains one of the most fundamental factors guiding subject 
choice. In order to explain the origin of the gender stereotyping of subjects Colley 
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argued that perceptions of male and female social roles and the abilities which are 
considered typical of these social roles leads to the assignment of subjects as 
masculine or feminine. Hence, the binary gender dichotomy presented below 
appears to be central to our gender-role concepts: 
 
Male    Female 
Rationality  Emotion 
Aggressive  Nurturing 
Objectivity  Subjectivity 
Science   Arts 
 
The acquisition of gender-role concepts   
 
Psychological essentialism  
 
Medin & Ortony (1989) proposed that humans approach the categorization of 
certain entities with an essentialist heuristic, known as psychological essentialism. This 
heuristic leads people to believe that members of a category share a deep 
underlying causal essence which confers their identity, and is responsible for many of 
their observable features, both perceptual and behavioural features. A distinction is 
made between metaphysical essentialism, the view that things have essences, and 
psychological essentialism, the view that people‘s representations of these things 
might reflect such a belief (as erroneous as it may be) (ibid).    
 
Furthermore, Medin and Ortony (1989) propose that peoples concepts contain an 
‗essence placeholder‘ as while people believe that a category has an underlying 
essence they may not know what it is, or which observable features of category 
members are linked to this essence.  Hence although it is difficult to obtain direct 
evidence of essentialism there is support for a varied set of early developing, 
essentialist-like beliefs about natural kind categories, including (1) the expectation 
that category members share non-obvious similarities in the face of conflicting 
perceptual information (Gelman, Collman & Maccoby, 1986); (2) category 
membership is believed to remain stable over time and transformations (Keil, 1994) 
and (3) properties of category members are considered to have innate origins and 
are impervious to environmental influences (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). While early 
formulations of psychological essentialism characterised the representation of 
natural kinds (e.g. plants and animals), in recent years evidence has emerged which 
suggests that humans also essentialise social kind categories such as race (Hirschfeld, 
1996),  caste (Mahalingham, 2001) and, of interest here, gender (Taylor, 1996). 
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Gender and essentialism 
 
Gender essentialism has been characterized in several different ways in the 
literature. Following Medin & Ortony‘s (1989) articulation of psychological 
essentialism, an essentialist construal of gender would entail the belief that females 
have an inner essence that distinguishes them from males, and is responsible for 
differences in appearance and behaviour between the sexes. There are several 
converging lines of research that support the view that an essentialist bias shapes 
children‘s and adult‘s representations of gender.  
 
One of the manifestations of essentialism is that categories are endowed with rich 
inductive potential (Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst, 2000). Several studies have 
demonstrated how the category of gender promotes rich inferences.  For example, 
Martin (1989) found adults readily infer a number of properties including role 
behaviours, traits and occupations on the basis of knowledge of sex group 
membership alone. A second manifestation of essentialism is ‗boundary 
intensification‘, which entails the treatment of category membership as mutually 
exclusive and an exaggeration of differences between category members 
(Gelman, 2003). In a review of studies exploring children‘s memory errors, Signorella 
and Liben (1987), have shown that children often misremember or deny gender 
anomalies such as a female firefighter. Finally, a third manifestation of essentialism is 
the belief in nativism; the assumption that properties of category members are the 
result of an innate potential, and will develop in spite of powerful environmental 
influences. In one of the first studies of gender essentialism from this perspective, 
Taylor (1996) found that four-year old children predicted that a hypothetical infant 
raised on an island with only members of the opposite sex would nonetheless grow 
up to display gender-stereotyped properties. Taylor (1996) also found that older 
children (10 years of age) and adults were more likely to recognise the potential 
impact of the environment on gender-role development than younger children. This 
is consistent with previous research, which has indicated that children initially 
attribute gender differences to biological causes, and only later recognise the role 
of environmental factors. However, there is disagreement about at which age this 
shift occurs, Ullian (1976), for example, reported that by age 12, children recognise 
that gender roles are a function of social conventions, whereas Smith and Russell 
(1984) found that even by age 15 only 61% of girls and 25% of boys explained 
gender differences in terms of social factors. Furthermore, adults have also been 
found to hold essentialist beliefs about gender, for example Mahalingham and 
Rodriguez (2003) found that American adults believed that a brain transplant from a 
member of the opposite sex would lead to a change in the gender specific 
behaviour of the recipient.   
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While most of the research reviewed has focused on beliefs about gender, there is 
some evidence which indicates that these beliefs may have an impact on 
behaviour. Martin, Ruble, & Szkrybalo (1995) found that children use knowledge of 
whether a toy is ―for girls‖ or ―for boys‖ to guide both their inferences about the toy 
preferences of other children and their own toy preferences. In a more recent study, 
Prentice and Miller (2006) found that participants who believed that they differed 
from a member of the opposite sex on a novel attribute (perceptual style) were 
significantly less likely to make corrections to their performance on a dot estimation 
test given the opportunity, than those who were told they were similar to a member 
of the opposite sex. This research suggests that cross-category differences trigger 
essentialist thinking about social categories.  
 
In order to account for why social categories such as gender are essentialised it has 
been  suggested that children perceive phenomenal variation in humans, and in 
order to make sense of this they resort to the essentialist heuristic from the natural 
kinds module (Atran, 1998). However, a crucial difference between animal and 
social categories is the role of culture in categorisation, while children and adults 
from various cultures seem to hold similar beliefs about animal categories, cultures 
differ in terms of how they conceive of the same social categories and which 
categories they essentialise (Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004). It is important, 
therefore, to consider the cultural factors which may contribute to the 
essentialisation of social categories. In relation to gender, Gelman (2003) has noted 
how cultural factors such as stereotyping and gender-typed practices can serve to 
heighten (or indeed dampen) an essentialising tendency.  
 
Present research  
 
While most of the existing literature concerning sex differences in subject choice is 
mainly devoted to describing or decrying them, it suggests that gender stereotyping 
plays an important part in guiding children‘s subject choices. There is evidence to 
suggest that psychological essentialism is crucial to our representations of social 
categories such as gender, and therefore may be one of the central cognitive 
biases underlying stereotyping (Haslam et al., 2002). Although most of the research 
reviewed above focused on beliefs about gender, it was seen that there some 
evidence to suggest that essentialist beliefs have an impact on behaviour (Prentice 
& Miller, 2006). The present study considers the possibility that children hold 
essentialist beliefs about gender, specifically, about sex differences in academic 
subject ability, which may help to explain sex differences in subject choices. Hence, 
the central research question addressed is: Do children hold gender essentialist 
beliefs about academic subject ability?  
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A thought experiment was conducted to examine the representations of gender 
held by 11-12 year old and 15-16 year old children. Specifically, children were asked 
to make inferences about two types of gendered attributes of a hypothetical male 
and female; (i) academic ability in stereotypically masculine and feminine subjects 
and (ii) gendered properties such as occupational preferences. There were three 
experimental conditions; an island condition to assess whether these attributes are 
considered to be open to environmental influence, a transplant condition to assess 
whether these attributes are believed to have a biological basis in the brain and a 
control condition to assess whether children are willing to make inferences about 
these attributes based on knowledge of sex group membership alone, as a baseline 
response.    
 
These age-groups were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, 11-12 year olds are just 
beginning at secondary school and will be required to choose their GCSE subjects at 
age 14, while 15-16 year olds are at the end of compulsory schooling and will be 
making important decisions about A-level subjects and/or careers. Secondly, 
previous research has indicated that there are important age-related changes in 
representations of social categories with older children moving away from essentialist 
beliefs and taking into account the role of environmental factors (Taylor, 1996). A 
sub-question that is addressed is whether there are age differences in essentialist 
beliefs. However, in their discussion of psychological essentialism Medin and Ortony 
(1989) propose that the people‘s concepts contain an essence placeholder, 
therefore, the present study also examines the possibility that older children reject an 
essentialist account because of their belief about the kind of attribute being 
considered, as opposed to a rejection of an essentialist account per se (Gelman, 
2003).  
 
Method 
 
Thought experiment 
 
In order to examine whether children hold gender essentialist beliefs about 
academic subject ability, a thought experiment was designed as this research 
method is most conductive to uncovering people‘s implicit mental representations 
(Gelman, 2003).  
 
Participants  
Fifty-four children, thirty 11-12 year olds and twenty four 15-16 year olds, attending a 
mixed sex comprehensive school in West London.   
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Experimental design  
A 3 (experimental condition: island, transplant and control) x 2 (age; 11-12 and 15-16 
year olds) x 2 (gendered attributes: academic ability in subjects and gendered 
properties) X 2 (sex of participant: male or female) X 2 (sex of character: male or 
female) design was used. Where experimental condition, age and sex of 
participants were between-subjects factors and gendered attributes and sex of 
character were within-subjects factors.  
 
Experiment materials 
 
Island condition 
One of the manifestations of essentialism is a belief that properties of category 
members are immutable and impervious to environmental influences (Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991). In order to obtain evidence of this the Island paradigm used by 
Taylor (1996) was adapted and forms the basis for the Island condition.   
 
Participants read two stories one about a 16 year old boy, Mark, who was raised 
from birth by his aunt on an island populated entirely by girls and women, and the 
second about a 16 year old girl, Sarah, raised from birth by her uncle on an island 
containing only boys and men. The task was divided into two sections; in the first 
section participants were required to predict Mark and Sarah‘s GCSE examinations 
grades in stereotypically feminine subjects (art, English and rextiles) and 
stereotypically masculine subjects (mathematics, physics and I.T) on a scale from A* 
to G. The subjects selected are those that have been highlighted by previous 
research and show the greatest discrepancy in take-up between the sexes in post-
compulsory education. The scale of A* to G was used as it is the official GCSE 
examination mark scheme, and therefore one that school children are familiar with.  
 
In the second section participants were asked to indicate their degree of 
agreement or disagreement about the likelihood of Mark and Sarah acquiring 8 
gendered properties; 4 stereotypically feminine properties (cries a lot, wears dresses, 
wants to be a ballet dancer and wants to be a nurse), and 4 stereotypically 
masculine properties (gets into fights, has short hair, wants to be a soldier and wants 
to be a fire-fighter) from Taylor‘s (1996) study. The properties were presented in a 
random order and the rating scale ranged from 1 (very strong agreement) to 7 (very 
strong disagreement), with 4 representing neither agreement nor disagreement. At 
the end of both sections participants were provided with a blank box and were 
asked to write down why they had chosen these answers. The task took them on 
average 20 minutes to complete.   
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Transplant condition 
Another manifestation of essentialism noted above is a belief in nativism. In a later 
study using the island paradigm, Taylor and Gelman (unpublished) found that in 
some cases children were suggesting that while children raised on the island would 
acquire gendered properties they may be less likely to display them (cf. Taylor, 1996). 
Therefore Mahalingham and Rodriguez‘s brain transplant paradigm was used as a 
more direct test of essentialist beliefs. Participants in this condition read a story about 
a 16 year old boy called Mark and a 16 year old girl called Sarah whose brains had 
been switched. The remaining procedure was identical to that in the island 
condition.  
 
Control condition 
In the control condition participants were required to make inferences about the 
two gendered attributes on the basis of sex group membership alone i.e. the names 
of the boy and girl. This condition also provides a baseline level of responses to 
ensure that the attributes used were ones that children found to be stereotypically 
feminine and masculine. If children are prepared to make inferences about 
gendered properties based on category membership this may also provide 
evidence of essentialism given that one of its manifestations is that social categories 
are infused with inductive potential. 
 
Procedure 
An equal number of participants were randomly assigned to the 3 experimental 
conditions (ten 11-12 year olds and eight 15-16 year olds in each condition). The 
participants were tested in their form group by one of the researchers in their own 
classrooms during a free study period.  The researcher introduced the research as a 
thought experiment about school children. Participants were informed the study 
would take 30 minutes to complete and they were given a consent form to sign. 
Consent was also obtained from the students‘ parents prior to the experiment.  The 
researcher emphasised that there are no right or wrong answers and the need to 
answer the questions independently, and in silence. The students were given the 
opportunity to withdraw from the experiment if they did not want to take part. Both 
the researcher and the class teacher ensured that no communication took place 
between the students during the procedure. Each participant read two short stories, 
one with a female character and one with a male character, and answered a series 
of questions. The order of presentation of the stories was counter-balanced across 
participants to minimise order effects. Upon completion of the task participants were 
debriefed, thanked for partaking in the study, and the researcher offered to answer 
any questions.   
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Results 
 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine whether children hold 
essentialist beliefs about the two gendered attributes. Preliminary ANOVAs revealed 
no significant main effect or interactions involving sex of participant, and thus data 
were pooled across this variable.  For all subsequent analyses 3 (experimental 
condition: control, transplant and island) X 2 (age: 11-12, 15-16) between- subjects 
ANOVAs were used. The alpha level was set at 0.05. All comparisons among means 
following significant ANOVAS were conducted using the Tukey-D test and r was 
calculated as the effect size. 
 
Sex differences in academic ability  
 
The main dependent variable, mean predicted GCSE grades, were aggregated 
across stereotypically feminine (art, English and textiles) and masculine subjects 
(mathematics and physics). If children hold essentialist beliefs about sex differences 
in academic ability they would predict a higher grade in stereotypically feminine 
subjects for the male in the transplant condition (male with female brain) than a 
male in either the island condition (opposite sex environment) or control condition 
(‗normal‘ male) and vice versa for the female. The predicted grades were reverse 
coded such that higher numbers represent higher grades, thus 8 = A* and 1 = G in 
order for the presentation of the results to be clearer and more intuitive.  
                          
Feminine subjects  
A two-way ANOVA for the female character‘s predicted grade in stereotypically 
feminine subjects revealed significant main effects for experimental condition F(2, 
48) = 16.739, p <.001, r = 0.68, and age F(1, 48) = 4.755, p < .05, r = 0.52. However, the 
interaction between experimental condition and age failed to reach statistical 
significance, F(2, 48) = 1.499, p = .234. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the 
predicted grade for the female character was significantly lower in the transplant 
condition (M = 5.2, SD = .96) than in the island condition (M = 6.1, SD = .98, p < 0.05) 
and control condition (M = 6.8, SD = .59, p < .001).  
 
The analysis of the male characters predicted grade revealed a significant main 
effect for experimental condition, F(2, 48) = 13.821, p < .001, r = 0.65. However, 
neither the main effect of age [F(1, 48) = 1.132, p =.293] nor the interaction effect 
[F(2, 48) = 2.105, p = .133] reached statistical significance. Post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that the predicted grade for the male in the transplant condition (M = 6.8, 
SD = .66) was significantly higher than in the island condition (M = 5.1, SD = 1.2, 
p<.001) and the control condition (M = 5.4, SD = .54, p < .001).  
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Masculine subjects  
A two-way ANOVA for the female and male character‘s mean GCSE grade in 
stereotypically masculine subjects revealed that neither the main effects of 
experimental condition [F (2, 48) = 1.206, p=.308, F (2, 48) = 2.732, p=.075, for female 
and male character respectively] and age [ F(1, 48) = 1.410, p=.241, F(1, 48) = .306, 
p= .583] nor the interaction effect [F(2, 48) =2.384, p=.103, F(2, 48= 2.915, p = .064] 
reached statistical significance. In order to explore why none of the effects reached 
statistical significance ANOVAs were performed for individual masculine subjects.   
 
Mathematics: An analysis of a two-way ANOVA for the female and male character‘s 
mean GCSE grade in mathematics revealed that neither the main effects for 
experimental condition [F (2, 48) =.548, p=.582. F (2, 48) = .965, p = .388, for the 
female and male character respectively] and age [F (1, 48) = 1.420, p=.239, F (1, 48) 
= .024, p = .878] nor the interaction effect [F (2, 48) = .709, p=.497, F (2, 48) = .860, p = 
.430] reached statistical significance.  
 
Physics: A two-way ANOVA for the female character‘s grade in physics revealed a 
significant main effect for experimental condition, F (2, 48) = 3.169, p < .05, r = 0.33. 
The main effect for age [F (1, 48) = 1.534, p=.222], did not reach statistical 
significance. The interaction effect was statistically significant, F (2, 48) = 4.611, p < 
.05, r = 0.58 Post-hoc comparisons following a one-way ANOVA, for 11-12 year olds 
indicated that the predicted physics grade for the female character was 
significantly higher in the transplant (M = 6.6, SD = 1.3) condition than in the island 
condition (M = 5.2, SD = 1.2 p < .05) and the control condition ( M = 5.0, SD = .61, p < 
.05). In contrast a one-way ANOVA for 15-16 year olds revealed that there were no 
statistically significant differences  in the predicted physics grade for the female 
character between the 3 experimental conditions, F (2, 21) =3.089, p= .067.  
 
A two-way ANOVA for the male character‘s grade in physics revealed a significant 
main effect for experimental condition, F (2, 48) = 5.309, p < .05, r = 0.44. The main 
effect for age did not reach statistical significance, F (1, 48) = .725, p=.399. However, 
the interaction effect was statistically significant, F (2, 48) = 4.958, p < .05, r = 0.53. A 
one-way ANOVA for 11-12 year olds revealed a statistically significant difference in 
the physics grade for the male character between the three experimental 
conditions, F (2, 27) = 9.809, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the 
physics grade for the male character was significantly lower in the transplant 
condition (M = 4.6, SD = 1.7) compared to the island condition (M = 6.2, SD = .63, p < 
.05) and the control condition (M = 6.8, SD = .79, p < .001). This indicates that 11-12 
year olds believe that a male with a female brain would do worse in GCSE physics 
than a male raised in an opposite sex environment and a ‗normal‘ male. In contrast 
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there were no statistically significant differences in the physics grade for the male 
character between the 3 experimental conditions for 15-16 year olds, F (2, 21) =1.961, 
p= .166.   
 
The acquisition of gender stereotypical properties  
 
The main dependent variable, mean predicted likelihood of acquiring gendered 
properties, were aggregated across stereotypically feminine (cries a lot, wears 
dresses, wants to be a nurse andwants to be a ballet dancer), and masculine 
properties (gets into fights a lot, has short hair, wants to be a fire-fighter and wants to 
be a soldier). If children hold essentialist beliefs about the acquisition of gender 
stereotyped properties they would be expected to predict that the male in the 
transplant condition (male with a female brain) is more likely to acquire feminine 
properties than the male in either the island condition (opposite sex environment) or 
control condition (‗normal‘ male). Similarly, they would be expected to predict that 
the female character in the transplant condition (female with male brain) is more 
likely to acquire masculine properties than the female in either the island (opposite-
sex environment) or control conditions (‗normal‘ female). The scores were coded 
such that lower numbers indicate higher likelihood as 1 = Very strongly agree, 4 = 
neither agree nor disagree and 7 = Very strongly disagree.  
 
Feminine properties 
A two-way ANOVA for the female character‘s predicted likelihood of acquiring 
feminine properties revealed a significant main effect for experimental condition, F 
(2, 48) = 11.947, p < .001, r = 0.62. The main effect for age failed to reach statistical 
significance, F(1, 48) =.948, p = .335. The interaction effect was statistically significant, 
F(2, 48) = 3.660, p < .05, r = 0.46. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that for 11-12 year 
olds the predicted likelihood of the female character acquiring feminine properties 
was significantly lower in the transplant condition (M = 5.0, SD = 1.1) compared to the 
island condition (M = 3.2, SD = 1.1, p <.001) and the control condition (M = 2.9, SD = 
.70, p < .001). In contrast there was no statistically significant difference between the 
3 experimental conditions for 15-16 year olds (p= .08). It is noteworthy that the means 
for the transplant and island condition are 4.3 and 4 respectively, which represents 
neither agree nor disagree suggesting that they are uncertain as to whether 
biological or social factors influence the acquisition of gendered properties.  
 
A two-way ANOVA for the male character‘s predicted likelihood of acquiring  
stereotypically feminine properties revealed significant main effect for experimental 
condition, F(2, 48) = 10.931, p< .001, r = 0.60. The main effect for age did not reach 
statistical significance, F(1, 48) =1.343, p = .252. The interaction effect was statistically 
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significant, F(2, 48) = 4.418, p<0.05, r = 0.50. Post-hoc comparisons for 11-12 year olds 
indicated that the likelihood of a male acquiring feminine properties was significantly 
higher in the transplant condition (M = 3.8, SD = 1.1) compared to both the island 
condition (M = 5.8, SD = 1.1, p< .001) and the control condition (M = 6.0, SD = .86,  p < 
.001). For 15-16 year olds the post-hoc comparisons indicated that the likelihood of 
the male acquiring feminine properties is significantly higher in the island condition 
(M = 4.0, SD = 1.8) compared to the control condition (M = 6.1, SD = 1.) p< .05). The 
transplant condition did not differ significantly from the other 2 conditions. However, 
as above the means for the transplant and the island conditions were 4 and 4.4 
respectively which again suggests they are uncertain about whether the acquisition 
of feminine properties is influenced by biological or social factors.   
 
Masculine properties  
A two-way ANOVA for the female character‘s predicted likelihood of acquiring 
stereotypically masculine properties revealed significant main effect for 
experimental condition F(2, 48) = 7.496, p< .001, r = 0.52. The main effect for age did 
not reach statistical significance F(1, 48) = 3.243, p = .078. The interaction effect was 
statistically significant, F(2, 48) = 3.600, p < .05, r = 0.49. Post-hoc comparisons for 11-
12 year olds indicated that the likelihood of the female acquiring masculine 
properties was significantly higher in the transplant condition (M = 3.7, SD = 1.0) 
compared to the island condition (M = 5.2, SD = 1.0 p< .001] and the control 
condition (M = 5.3, SD = 4.3, p < .001]. In contrast there was not a statistically 
significant difference between the 3 experimental conditions for 15-16 year olds, (p= 
.133).  
 
The analysis for the male character‘s predicted likelihood of acquiring stereotypically 
masculine properties revealed a significant main effect for experimental condition 
F(2, 48) = 22.349, p< .001, r = 0.73. The main effect for age did not reach statistical 
significance, F(1, 48) = .910, p = .345. The interaction effect was statistically 
significant, F(2, 48) = 7.139, p < .05, r = 0.62272. For 11-12 year olds post-hoc 
comparisons indicated that the predicted likelihood of a male acquiring masculine 
characteristics was significantly lower in the transplant condition (M = 4.9, SD = .62) 
compared to the island condition (M = 3.0, SD = .62, p = .001) and the control 
condition (M = 2.7 , SD = .59, p< .001). For 15-16 year olds the likelihood of the male 
possessing masculine properties characteristics was significantly higher in the control 
condition (M = 2.7, SD = 1.2) compared to both transplant condition (M = 4.2, SD = 
.85, p< .05) and the island condition (M = 4.3, SD = 97, p < .05). As above, the means 
for the transplant and island conditions fall in the neither agree nor disagree 
category (4), again indicating uncertainty about the factors influencing the 
acquisition of gendered properties.  
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Summary of results  
Overall, results from the experiment showed that both 11-12 year olds and 15-16 year 
olds appear to hold essentialist beliefs about sex differences in academic ability in 
stereotypically feminine subjects. Only 11-12 year olds were found to hold essentialist 
beliefs about sex differences in stereotypically masculine subjects. Furthermore, 11-12 
year olds were found to be more likely to hold essentialist beliefs about gender-
stereotyped properties; masculine and feminine than 15-16 year olds who appear to 
be ambivalent as to the factors influencing the acquisition of these properties.  
 
Discussion 
 
Gender essentialism is the theoretical position that the categories of male and 
female have an inner essence that it is this inner essence that is responsible for 
observable sex differences. The present study explored whether this mode of 
category representation is indicative of the persistence of sex segregation in 
educational subject choice.  
 
The thought experiment results indicate that school children hold essentialist beliefs 
about gender. Although such beliefs vary as a function of both the age of 
participants and the gendered attributes considered, both 11-12 and 15-16 year olds 
were found to hold essentialist beliefs about academic ability in stereotypically 
feminine subjects, predicting, for instance, that a following a brain transplant from a 
female, a male would achieve higher grades in art, English and textiles than a male 
raised by women or a ‗normal‘ male. In relation to stereotypically masculine subjects 
no significant differences were found in the grades for mathematics across the 
experimental conditions for both age-groups. While only 11-12 year olds were found 
to hold essentialist beliefs about academic ability in physics. Although these findings 
do not provide direct evidence of essentialism, this is the first study to provide 
converging evidence for three manifestations of psychological essentialism; (1) 
inductive potential; children made inductive inferences about academic subject 
ability on the basis of knowledge of sex group membership alone, (2) a belief in 
nativism; children believe that academic subject ability has a biological basis in the 
brain and (3) immutability; academic subject ability is not seen perceived as open 
to environmental influence.  
 
Whilst acknowledging that gender stereotyping is not the only factor guiding subject 
choice, the fact that children hold essentialist beliefs about academic subject ability 
may deter them from choosing subjects that are not stereotypically aligned with 
their own gender for further study. There is some evidence to suggest that holding 
essentialist beliefs has an impact on behaviour (Martin et al, 1995) so these 
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essentialist beliefs about sex differences in academic ability in stereotypically 
masculine and feminine studies may well influence children‘s subject choices.  
Children were found to hold less essentialist beliefs about masculine subjects which 
may help to explain why boys show more of a bias in subject choice than girls 
(Whitehead, 1996). Furthermore, Leaper (2000) has argued that boys have more at 
stake than girls in maintaining group boundaries due to males‘ higher status in 
society. The role of power and status in relation to essentialist representations of 
social categories remains relatively unexplored (although see Mahalingham, 2001), 
and is an important area for future research.  
  
In the second part of the experiment children were required to make inferences 
about the gendered properties from Taylor‘s (1996) study. It was found that 11-12 
year olds appear to hold essentialist beliefs about gender-stereotyped properties 
predicting, for instance, that a male with a female brain is more likely to acquire 
feminine properties than a male raised by only women and a ‗normal‘ male, yet 
the15-16 year old participants were found to be ambivalent as to the factors 
influencing the acquisition of these properties. Previous research has suggested that 
as children get older they move away from an essentialist construal of gender, an 
important finding in this study is that even 15-16 year olds appear to view certain, but 
not all, gendered attributes in essentialist terms. Based on the present findings it is 
plausible that what previous researchers uncovered was not that the older children 
and adults were no longer essentialist per se but just that they did not construe the 
specific gendered attributes participants were asked to make inferences about in 
essentialist terms. In other words, they may still believe there are innate sex 
differences in certain skills and attributes but not about others. Another possibility 
leading on from this is that some of the older participants may not perceive the brain 
to be central to gender identity, one of the 15-16 year old participants in the 
transplant condition for instance stated: ‗Some things would change but there are 
differences in the body too – like hormones‘. 
 
Overall, the present data suggest that gender essentialism may be ongoing in 
development and future research needs to uncover which attributes people believe 
are linked to the gender essence, as well as where the essence is believed to be 
located.   
 
Although the extent to which these results can be generalized needs to be 
considered. Previous studies on essentialism have been conducted with mainly 
white, middle-class samples, the present study was conducted at school where a 
significant majority (70%) of the students come from an ethnic minority and it is 
possible that gender attitudes are relatively less liberal in this sample. Future research 
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should broaden the range of samples and consider the intersection of gender, class 
and ethnicity. 
 
Another issue that needs to be considered is that of individual differences between 
the participants, based on the explanations they provided for their answers some 
appear to have an essentialist orientation stating ‗girls are better than boys in some 
subjects like textiles but boys are better at science‘, while others refused to make 
gender-category based inferences stating that ‗the information provided was too 
vague‘. Of relevance to educational subject choice is the possibility that the gender 
stereotyping of subject areas is more of an attraction/deterrent to some pupils than 
others.  
 
A further nother issue that needs to be addressed concerns the use of thought 
experiments as a way of uncovering gender representations. There is evidence to 
suggest that some of the 15-16 year olds over-interpreted the task, for instance 3 of 
the participants in the island condition mentioned that there were no computers on 
the island and therefore they could not predict grades for I.T. It is for this reason that 
predicted grades for I.T were excluded from the analysis. This illustrates the need for 
future research to utilise a more sensitive measure of older children‘s knowledge. 
Finally, the role of culture in relation to essentialist representations of social categories 
remains relatively underspecified. Although psychological essentialism is a cognitive 
heuristic which categories people essentialize varies both across and within cultures. 
More research is required which explores the role of culture in essentialism, 
specifically the cultural conditions including the nature of cultural discourse that 
serve to heighten or inhibit children‘s essentialist beliefs about social categories such 
as gender.  
 
Conclusion 
 
If an attempt is to be made to design policies or campaigns that counteract 
prevailing gender stereotypes and their influence upon subject choice it needs to be 
based on an understanding of both the acquisition, and nature of gender-role 
concepts. While the present study is only the first step in this direction, the current 
findings suggest that psychological essentialism as a theory of category 
representation may underlie the gender stereotyping of subjects amongst children, 
and may explain why sex differences in subject choice persist despite 30 years of 
gender reform policies.   
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